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Evidence on the role of ownership structure on firms’
innovative performance 
Raquel Ortega-Argilés1 and Rosina Moreno2
ABSTRACT: Based on the Knowledge Production Function framework given by
Griliches (1979), we slightly modify it so that the innovative output depends upon a
set of factors related to the firm internal characteristics and are influenced by the envi-
ronment. Specifically, regarding the firm internal determinants the effect of the con-
centration of the ownership, the composition of the boards of directors and the effect
of the nature of the ownership (foreign and public) are analyzed. Additionally, in order
to capture the determinants of the environment in which the firm operates other varia-
bles concerning the internationalization of market, the agglomeration economies and
the regional knowledge externalities are also considered. In order to assess the impact
of these determinants on the number of patents and models of use awarded by the
firm, the discreteness of the latter variable has to be taken into account. We apply Pois-
son and Negative Binomial models for a more comprehensive evaluation of the hypot-
hesis in a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms. The results show patenting activity is
positively favoured by being located in an environment with a high innovative acti-
vity, due to the existence of knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies.
JEL classification: D210, O310, G320.
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Evidencia sobre el papel de la estructura de propiedad en la actividad innova-
dora de las empresas
RESUMEN: Partiendo del enfoque de la función de producción del conocimiento
desarrollado por Griliches (1979), modificándola levemente de modo que el resul-
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tado innovador dependa de un sistema de factores relacionados con las características
internas de las empresas y que están influenciadas por el ambiente. Específicamente,
con respecto a los determinantes internos de las empresas, se analizan el efecto de la
concentración de la propiedad, la composición de las juntas directivas y el efecto de
la naturaleza de la propiedad (extranjera y pública). Además, para capturar los deter-
minantes del ambiente en el cual la firma opera, se consideran otras variables referen-
tes a la internacionalización del mercado, las economías de la aglomeración y las ex-
ternalidades regionales del conocimiento. Para determinar el impacto de estos
determinantes en el número de patentes y en los modelos de utilidad obtenidos por la
empresa, considerando el carácter discreto de la variable. Aplicamos los modelos de
Poisson y binomiales negativos para una evaluación más completa de la hipótesis en
un panel de empresas industriales españolas. Los resultados muestran que la activi-
dad de desarrollo de patentes se ve favorecida positivamente al estar localizada en
una región de alta actividad innovadora, debido a la existencia de externalidades de
conocimiento y de economías de aglomeración.
Clasificación JEL: D210, O310, G320.
Palabras clave: Función de producción de conocimiento, patentes, I+D, estructura
de propiedad, regiones.
1. Introduction
The Knowledge Production Function (KPF) framework originally developed by Gri-
liches (1979) has been widely used to analyse the relationship between firms’ R&D
investment and patent applications, the latter seen as a relevant, although not perfect,
measure of the technological effectiveness of R&D activities. This basic model was
lately modified so that the increment of the innovative output depends upon a number
of further factors related to the internal characteristics of the firms and environmental
variables related with the market and the region where the firm is operating. 
The literature shows that a company’s ability to innovate depends on a series of
factors, in such a way that whether or not they are present has a favourable or unfa-
vourable influence on the innovation process. Among others, these factors may be
placed in the following groups: 
1. The existence of favourable conditions in the demand structure or in market
size, in the life cycle of the products the company manufactures, or in the
evolution of the scientific procedures and technology it employs. The condi-
tions of the environment are mainly captured by the characteristics of the
market and the region where the firm decides to be located.
2. The resources the company allocates to engineering, design, research and
marketing. 
These favourable conditions together with the company’s technical capacity need
to be integrated within the framework of an innovative strategy in order that the fo-
llowing factors can be called into play: 
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3. The company’s management and organisational structure. 
4. The company’s desire to differentiate its products or processes from those of
its competitors. 
While many studies analyse specific factors that determine the company’s ability
to patent very few incorporate variables related with the corporate governance cha-
racteristics. 
Aspects related to the ownership structure of the firm, such as the level of ow-
nership concentration, the composition of the decision-making powers or the nature
of this ownership, among others, have been avoided in the innovative literature so far.
Although, there exist a number of papers that analyse the influence of some corporate
governance variables on the R&D investments (Hosono et al., 2004; Hill and Snell,
1988; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2003), in our knowledge there are few works that explain
the effect of some variables related with the management and the organisational and
ownership structure on the firm innovative performance measured by patents. 
A few attempts in the literature try to explain this relationship focussing the atten-
tion to the information asymmetries between managers and owners in the firm deci-
sion-making process. 
On the one hand, the literature pointed that large shareholders have strong incen-
tives in profit maximization and enough control over the assets of the firm to put
pressure on managers to have their interest respected and risky projects maintained
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the same line, some studies explain that the concen-
tration of capital in a small number of owners helps to align the management team
with the shareholders’ interests, leading to reducing high risk investment policies
such as the ones of innovation, and to a loss of some of the benefits of specialisation
(Hill and Snell, 1988; Burkart et al., 1997). The question to address from these stu-
dies is: has the concentration of the ownership in few hands a direct impact of firm
innovative performance?
On the other hand, the incorporation of owners in the management positions and
the composition of the boards of directors appear to be relevant in the process of re-
source allocation devoted to innovative activities. The entrepreneurship literature put
emphasis in the role played by the entrepreneur, which most people recognize as me-
aning someone who organizes and assumes the risk of a business in return of the pro-
fits. In many cases (and in almost all large corporations), owners delegate decisions
to salaried managers, and the question is: are independent directors better suited as
decision-makers for innovative strategies than insiders? The owners have appro-
priate information about firm’s activities and this is fruitful to enhance innovation,
but in most cases, the innovative activities carry out “new combinations” by such
things as introducing new products or processes, identifying new exports markets or
sources of supply, or creating new types of organization and the owner needs judg-
ment to deal with the novel situations connected with innovation (Casson, 1991;
Crespi, 2004). 
Some others papers have focussed their research in the analysis of the effect of
the nature of the ownership and the presence of outsiders on the innovative result. It
is frequently argued that branch plants have a relatively low level of autonomy with
regard to major decisions. So, in the case of centralization of decisions within a fo-
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reign parent company, the implementation of innovations originating at the plant le-
vel is likely to be considered at a corporate rather than plant level (Bishop and Wise-
man, 1999). Also, publicly-owned firms are characterized for developing a risk ad-
verse competitive strategy in all the investments in which they are involved
(Lafuente et al., 1985). In fact, the literature analysing the subject of ownership has
provided interesting papers with the objective of studying the relationship between
ownership and performance (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Mørck et al., 1988; Smith and
Watts, 1992). The debate in the corporate governance literature goes back to Berle
and Means (1932) with the suggestion of an inverse relation between the diffuseness
of shareholdings and firm performance. Ownership structure thus seems to be an im-
portant issue when adopting risky decisions such as innovation investments. Howe-
ver, as far as we know, there is very little evidence concerning the role that may be
played by a company’s ownership structure on its innovative performance, and espe-
cially on its patenting activity. 
In this paper we analyse the impact that some internal and external variables may
have on firm patenting activities. As regards to the internal characteristics of the firm,
we focus our attention in the characteristics of the ownership structure, although we
also control for the traditional ones (size, age and sector). Regarding the external cha-
racteristics of the firm, we focus our attention on the environment in which the firm is
developing its activity. The environment can be characterized by the determinants of
the market were the firm operates and the determinants of the region where the firm
is located. 
On the one hand, the market where the firm is operating is determinant in characte-
rising the innovative behaviour of the firms. Operating in highly competitive markets
creates a pushing effect that forces firms to secure their innovation from the competi-
tors to maintain their market shares. The presence of Porter externalities, which are due
to the fact that the firm is operating in a highly competitive and specialized environ-
ment, is higher in markets characterized by an international or global dimension. 
On the other hand, being located in a highly innovative region generates know-
ledge spillovers creating a favourable environment for innovation (Audretsch and
Feldman, 1999 and 2005, Greunz, 2004 and van der Panne, 2004). The innovative re-
gional dimension, captured by a strong regional innovative intensity (by means of the
presence of highly innovative inputs) or regional innovative performance (by means
of a high innovation output per citizen), creates agglomerating forces and knowledge
externalities exerting a positive impact in the firms operating in such regions (basi-
cally Marshall-Arrow-Romer —MAR— and Jacobs externalities). The accessibility
to labour force or the industrial dynamicity generates agglomeration economies that
influence positively the innovative behaviour of the located firms (Autant-Bernard,
2001). The regional or local firms’ competition for ideas, which are embodied in indi-
vidual employees, is determined by industry-specific firm-employment ratio: the
more firms per employee, the better individuals are enabled to pursue and implement
new ideas due to a higher dynamicity in the area. 
Basically, we can summarize that this paper evaluates the influence of internal
and external characteristics of the firm on the patenting activity in the context of a
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knowledge production function. The empirical analysis will be carried out for a sam-
ple of Spanish manufacturing firms from the period 1990-2002. Due to the lower
share of firms that account patents in our sample, we decided to include the utility
models or models of use, as an appropriate measure of the innovative activity of the
firm in the same line than other authors (Beneito, 2006). Given the discreteness of the
output variable, econometric models for count panel data are considered. 
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction with a short review of
the literature related to the subject, section two describes the methodology, discussing
the advantages of the method of analysis chosen. Section three describes the data and
the variables to be introduced in the analysis. We then describe the main results from
our study in section five. Finally, section six concludes.
2. Methodology
The basic model considers patents as a function of contemporary and/or lagged flow
of the firms’ R&D expenditures. In this paper we consider a group of determinants in
the KPF such as the firm’s size and age, the technological opportunity and the com-
petition level of the sector to which the firm belongs to, aspects related with the mar-
ket and the location where the firm is operating as well as some additional ones rela-
ted to the ownership concentration and status of the firm. The usual way to deal with
the discrete non-negative nature of the patent dependent variable is to consider a
count data model, among which the most common is the Poisson regression model,
in which the number of events, given a set of regressors x, has a Poisson distribution
with parameters where i indexes firms and t indexes time periods:
λit = exp (xit β) = exp [β0 + β1 log (RDit) + β2zit ]
so that is the vector of parameters to be estimated, RD is the flow of R&D expenditu-
res and z represents the other determinants of patents (for a short description of the
variables see Table 1). We can use the time series dimension to control for unobser-
ved heterogeneity in the cross sectional unit. A key advantage of longitudinal data
over cross-sectional data is that it permits more general types of individual heteroge-
neity. The firm-specific term of either the random or fixed effect models proxy unob-
served firm-specific propensity to patent.  
The application of the Poisson model requires equality of means and variance,
which is not always met in practice. If the data show an excess of zeros, the standard
errors of the Poisson model will be biased to the low end, giving spurious high values
for the t statistics (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990). The most common formulation for
taking into account this excess of zeros is the negative binomial model, which does
not impose equidispersion in the dependent variable. This assumes that the variance
is a quadratic function of the mean. We will estimate both type of models3. 
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the same.
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3. Dataset and variables
3.1. Dataset
The database used is the Survey of Entrepreneurial Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estra-
tegias Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) produced by the “Public Enterprise Founda-
tion” of Spain for what is today the Ministry of Science and Technology (previously
the Ministry of Industry and Energy). The Public Enterprise Foundation’s Economic
Research Programme designed the survey, supervises its annual production and
maintains the database. The ESEE is a statistical research project that surveys a num-
ber of companies representing manufacturing industries in Spain on an annual basis.
Its design is relatively flexible and it has two applications. On the one hand, it provi-
des in-depth knowledge of the industrial sector’s evolution over time by means of
multiple data concerning business development and company decisions. The ESEE is
also designed to generate microeconomic information that enables econometric mo-
dels to be specified and tested. As far as its coverage is concerned, the reference po-
pulation of the ESEE is companies with ten or more workers in what is usually
known as manufacturing industry. The geographical area of reference is Spain, and
the variables have a timescale of one year. One of the most outstanding characteris-
tics of the ESEE is its high degree of representativeness. The ESEE contemplates the
production activity of firms aggregated to a 2-digit level corresponding to the manu-
facturing sector. This aggregation in 20 industries corresponds to the NACE-CLIO4.
3.2. Internal firm characteristics
As Beneito (2003) points out, the possibility offered by the ESEE of considering not
only patents, but also utility models, is particularly important in a sample where the
number of SMEs, as we will see later, is considerable. Large proportions of innova-
tions in SMEs are incremental innovations and are not reflected as patents. However,
the consideration of utility models may serve to compensate for this, as long as they
are a means of protecting incremental innovations. Therefore, the number of patents
and utility models obtained by a firm in the years under analysis is the dependent va-
riable (PAT). A utility model can be seen as an exclusive right granted for an invention,
which allows the holder to prevent others from using the protected invention commer-
cially for a limited period of time, without authorization. The requirements for acqui-
ring utility models are less stringent than for patents, their term of protection is shorter
and they vary from country to country. Utility models are much cheaper to obtain and
maintain, and finally, in some countries utility model protection can only be obtained
in certain fields of technology and then only for products, not for processes. 
We include as firm innovative inputs the variable RD. It is constructed as the lo-
garithm of the total R&D expenditures incurred by the firm in a given year. Thus, ac-
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4 NACE is a general industrial classification of economic activities within the European Union and CLIO
is the Classification and Nomenclature of the Input-Output table. Both classifications are officially recog-
nised by the Accounting Economic System (National Institute of Statistics INE: http://www.ine.es).
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cording with the literature, we can expect that as higher firm research and develop-
ment expenses as higher the number of patents accounted by the firm.
The variable SHARE reflects the effects of the mechanism that seeks to increase
the concentration of ownership and so control managerial behaviour. This variable
describes, therefore, the percentage of the company’s share capital in the hands of the
main shareholder6. A high concentration may act as a mechanism to relieve any
agency problems arising from the lack of identity between ownership and control.
However, a high degree of control wielded by the owners over the management team,
owing to a high level of concentration, can lead to a reduction in the number of high-
risk investments and, hence, fewer innovative activities. A number of studies con-
clude that while concentration may reduce the agency problem, it might also mean
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5 High technological opportunity sectors are: Office machinery, computers and optics; Chemical pro-
ducts; Mechanical equipment; Electronic machinery; Motors and autos; other transport material; Publis-
hing and graphic arts. Medium sectors are: the meat industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rub-
ber and plastics; non-metallic mineral products; metallurgy; metal products. Low sectors are: textiles and
clothing, leather and footwear, wood; paper; furniture and other manufacturing industries (this classifica-
tion has also been used in Lafuente and Lecha 1988 and Beneito 2003, among others).
6 The variable SHARE has been built using the information of the question survey “State whether other
company or companies has a stake into the company’s capital. If that was the case, please state the per-
centage owned by the company with the biggest stake”. For the relative high values of the variable distri-
bution the variable captures the concentration of the ownership in a more severe way, in the case of lower
values it can be the case that the results appear a bit biased to the higher ones. 
Variables Description
PAT
RD
RD-2
RDMEAN
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
OWN
FOR
PUB
HIGH
SECTOR
MARKET
EMPLREG
INNOVREG
PATREG
RDREG
YEAR
Number of national patents, foreign patents and utility models
R&D expenses (base=1992) in logs
Two year lagged R&D expenses in logs
Mean of the R&D expenses during the last three years in logs
Number of employees (31st December) in logs
Years since the company was first founded in logs
Percentage of the company’s share capital in hands of the main shareholder
Percentage of the owners or relatives in management positions of the total number of em-
ployees
1 for firms that have foreign capital; 0 otherwise
1 for firms that have public or state capital; 0 otherwise
1 for firms belonging to a high technological opportunity sector; 0 otherwise5
2-digit sectoral dummy variables
1 for firms whose main market is the international one; 0 otherwise
Ratio of the employment of the region over the total employment of Spain.
1 for firms locating in a region with technological opportunity higher than the average level
Number of registered patents per resident accounted in the region
Ratio of the R&D expenditures in the region over the total R&D investment in Spain
Year dummies
Table 1. Variables in the model
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that the firm no longer enjoys the benefits of specialisation (Burkart et al., 1997; Hill
and Snell, 1988).Therefore, the expected effect on patenting activity would be nega-
tive, because of the limited action of the managers in making high-risk decisions such
as those involved in introducing innovative activities. 
The variable OWN, is the number of owners or family members holding manage-
ment posts expressed as a percentage of the company’s total staff as of 31 December
in the years analysed7. This variable seeks to reflect how the appointment of owners
to decision-making posts may alleviate problems associated with the separation of
ownership and management functions. Such a separation has a series of advantages
which businesses cannot ignore, in particular in terms of specialisation and the grea-
ter efficiency with which this endows the decision-making process. In the specific
case of investment decisions, the effect of this separation of functions and the redu-
ced specialisation of the management team can lead to cuts in investment for the de-
velopment of activities related to a firm’s growth opportunities, which is the case of
patent accounts. Therefore a negative effect of having owners in management posi-
tions is expected on the volume of patents acquired by the firm.  
Some other variables explaining the nature of the corporate ownership are inclu-
ded. On the one hand, the foreign ownership influence is explained by the dichoto-
mous variable FOR, which takes the value of the unit when the firm has foreign ow-
nership and a null value when the all the ownership is domestic. On the other hand,
the effect of having public ownership is captured by the dichotomous variable PUB,
which takes the value of the unit when the ownership of the firm is partially or totally
public and a null value otherwise. These dichotomous variables have been used to
analyse the cross-effects of the having a concentrated ownership or having owners in
management positions and at the same time being partly or totally foreign or public
company. 
The variables describing the company’s internal structure include the variable
SIZE, which shows the size of the business8 —the total number of personnel as of 31
December; and the variable AGE, which shows the company’s age or maturity— the
number of years since the company was first founded. As regards the former, Schum-
peter (1942) emphasised the positive influence of size on innovation, while a number
of theoretical studies claim that larger companies have potentialities such as econo-
mies of scale, lower risk, a larger market and greater opportunities for appropriation
(Fernández, 1996). However, empirical studies do not describe such a clear picture.
So we find those that report a positive relationship between size and innovation
(Scherer, 1992; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Love et al., 1990; Cohen and Kleeper, 1996;
among others), and others that are unable to confirm this positive influence (Mans-
field, 1964; Acs and Audretsch, 1991; among others, who report that small firms have
238 Ortega-Argilés, R. and Moreno, R.
7 The variable OWN has been constructed with the information of family members or relatives in mana-
gerial posts. The fact that a similar variable has been used in other studies for classifying family and non-
family firms shows that the results of this particular variable will reflect mostly the problems of the iden-
tification of managers and owners in the case of Spanish business family firms (Ortega-Argilés, 2007). 
8 Other variables such as total sales might also have been considered. In previous analyses we have ob-
served that results remain the same regardless of the variable used to proxy firm size.
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an innovative advantage in highly innovative industries and in highly competitive
markets). The age variable has also been widely studied as a determinant of a firm’s
innovative activities. A firm’s age indicates the experience and knowledge that it has
accumulated throughout its history and seems to be linked to a better management of
its communication systems and of higher levels of the creativity needed to innovate,
as well as to a more effective capacity to absorb (Galende and De la Fuente, 2003).
The expected sign for the age variable, in line with the literature, is therefore positive. 
We have classified the firms into different categories depending on the technolo-
gical opportunity of the sector to which they belong, since technological opportunity
can be considered as being determined by the characteristics of the specific industrial
sector. Variables of this type would seem to capture various dimensions of techno-
logy including technological opportunity, technology life-cycle, the necessity for
complementary and specialised assets when implementing innovations and appro-
priability regimes (either by protection strategies of intellectual property rights as a
barrier to entry, or by informal processes such as the first-mover advantage or a con-
tinuous implementation of innovation processes). Following Lafuente et al. (1985),
the industrial sectors are classified here as presenting high, medium or low technolo-
gical opportunities9. In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, we have eliminated
the middle category. Therefore, the variable HIGH is a dichotomous variable which
takes the value 1 when the company belongs to a high technological opportunity sec-
tor of activity and 0 when it does not. We expect those companies belonging to high
opportunity sectors to show greater innovative activity than those belonging to me-
dium opportunity sectors. In some specifications of the model a set of two-digit
dummy variables has been included to analyse in more detailed way how the techno-
logical opportunity may differ between different sectors of activity.
Taking into account the effect that the environment in which the firm is operating
can have on its capability to innovate, some variables are taken into consideration.
Trying to capture the competitive environment where the firm operates, the variable
MARKET has been included. This provides information concerning the geographical
area of the main market. It is a dichotomous variable that classifies companies accor-
ding to whether their market is greater than, or equal to, the national area. It takes the
null value when it is smaller than the national area. This variable shows the effect on
R&D activities of a company’s decision to expand its market to a larger geographical
area, with an a priori expectation that firms with a larger main market carry out inno-
vative activities with greater intensity10.
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9 High technological opportunity sectors are: office machinery, computer processing, optical and similar
equipment; chemical products; machinery and mechanical equipment; electrical and electronic machi-
nery and material; motors and autos; other transport material, publishing and graphic arts. Medium sec-
tors are: the meat industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rubber and plastics; non-metallic mine-
ral products; Metallurgy; metal products. Low sectors are: Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear,
wood; Paper; Furniture and other manufacturing industries. (This classification has also been used in La-
fuente et al., 1988 and Beneito, 2003, among others).
10 Several studies include factors related to the market characteristics in which a firm operates. See, for
example, Blundell et al. (1999), Crépon et al. (1998), Kraft (1989), Licht and Zoz (1998), among others. 
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3.3. Firm location determinants
Finally, some additional variables have been constructed to complement the baseline
model and capture the effects of firm location. The fact that the ESEE is not represen-
tative in a regional way, forces us to use another source of data for capturing the re-
gional effects. We use the data for the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE) and
the Spanish Office of Patents and Trademarks. 
The dichotomous variable INNOVREG, which describes the innovative beha-
viour of the region in which the firm is located, places firms in one of two categories:
the firms that are located in a region with technological opportunities (R&D expenses
per employee) higher than the mean for the Spanish regions take the value 1, while
those with a score lower than the mean take a value of 0. The regions that are consi-
dered as having the higher technological opportunity level in Spain are Catalonia,
Madrid, Navarre, Valencia and the Basque Country. We expect the firms located in a
region with high technological opportunities to have greater possibilities of obtaining
R&D output. 
The variable EMPLREG is based on information from the Encuesta Industrial,
and tries to pick up the effect of the agglomeration economies. It is constructed as the
ratio of manufacturing employment in each region11 over the total manufacturing em-
ployment in Spain for the year under observation. This variable tries to capture the
economic industrial dynamicity of the region, and will explain how the presence of
MAR or Jacobs externalities coming from being situated in a region with high econo-
mic activity can influence the patent activity of the firm. The higher the ratio, the hig-
her the accessibility to a better endowment of human capital and the industrial acti-
vity of the region. The hypothesis that can be tested is therefore that agglomeration
economies incentive competiveness increasing the patentability of the firms located
in such regions.
The variable PATREG and RDREG capture the regional knowledge spillovers.
The variable PATREG, one of the traditional proxies of regional absorptive capaci-
ties, is constructed as the number of the registered patents per resident in the region
where each firm is located and shows the patentability effort of the region. A positive
relation has been postulated between the absorptive capacity at the regional level and
the innovative performance of the firms located in the region. The expected effect is
that the innovative performance of the region causes a positive effect into the firms
that are registered in such region.  
With regard to the variable RDREG, another traditional proxy of regional absorp-
tive capacity, it captures the innovative effort of the region where the firm is located,
and is constructed by the amount of R&D expenses of the region over the total
amount of R&D expenses accounted in Spain during the year under consideration. In
an intuitive way, we may think that the transformation of inputs into innovative out-
puts requires some time, which has motivated us to include the two-year lagged value
of this variable. A positive effect of the innovative past R&D effort of the region is
expected on the patentability activity of the firms located in it. Similar results was
240 Ortega-Argilés, R. and Moreno, R.
11 The study considers as a region the so called Comunidades Autónomas. 
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found by Bottazzi and Peri (2003) that demonstrate that increasing the R&D in one
region is found to increase innovation output capture by patent applications. That
R&D generates tacit knowledge not easily transferred over large distances is a com-
mon result in much of the empirical literature on knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, Traj-
tenberg and Henderson, 1993; Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen, 2006; Griffith, Lee
and Van Reenen, 2007).
In order to check the robustness of the model, some additional specifications have
been checked, the inclusion of lagged values of the innovation input variable (RD
-2),
or the average of R&D expenditures in the last three years (RDMEAN) are some of
them. 
4. Empirical findings
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics regarding the main variables in our
study. 
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Table 2. Descriptive analysis
Variables Mean Min Median Max Std. Dev. Share Diff.from 0
PAT
RD
RDMEAN
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
OWN
0.6557
123918.8
3.1279
270
23
27.86
2.72133
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
47
25
0
0
500
1.40e+08
17.4767
25363
266
100
100
7.1390
1579794
5.2624
837
22
41.1956
5.4396
8.69
23.04
20.53
—-
—-
—-
—-
As can be seen, the patent activity is not surprisingly higher in the Spanish manu-
facturing sector, less than 9% of the firms do patent. With respect to the R&D expen-
ditures, only around 23% of the firms appear to invest in R&D. Regarding the pre-
vious two variables, it is worthy to point out the huge overdispersion that account the
two continuous variables based on patent and R&D information. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the KPF for our baseline specification.
Special attention is paid to the firm internal ownership structure. Table 4 presents the
estimation results distinguishing by technological opportunity of the sector. Table 5
presents the estimation results for the model including the regional context in which
the firm is operating. Finally, Table 5 includes as well some robustness checks with
different specifications of the R&D input variable. All the tables include the results
obtained with the estimation of a count-data model using both the poisson and the ne-
gative binomial model, taking into account the over-dispersion in the dependent va-
riable, the total number of patents and utility models that the firm accounts every
year. Since we want to do inference on the population, the assumption of using the
random-effects estimation when we are sampling on a larger population of firms se-
ems reasonable since a random-effects specification assumes that individual specific
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constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units (Cameron and
Trivedi, 1998). This section will summarize the results focussing on the determinants
that have been included in the different specifications of the model.
The coefficients of current and lagged R&D expenditures are all significant and
positive, although with a value which is slightly lower than those found in other em-
pirical studies (see table 5 for the robustness checks in which different specification
of the R&D effort have been taken into account). Regarding the firm internal deter-
minants, firm size has the expected positive sign in all the specifications of the mo-
del, a result in line with the literature (Scherer, 1965; Schumpeter, 1942; among ot-
hers). The age of the firms appears to have a negative effect, the more mature is the
firms the fewer patents it accounts; although when we run the analysis only for the
firms belonging to high technological opportunity level (Table 4) we found that the
maturity of the firm can increase the chances of patenting. There seems to be lear-
ning by doing effect in these particular set of sectors. This can easily be explained by
the fact that firms that are operating in these sectors have a more competitive envi-
ronment and their innovations have to be protected in order to maintain their market
share (Table 4). As regards to the technological opportunity level of the sector of acti-
vity, firms belonging to high-tech sectors have a positive effect of accounting patents.
These results are similar to earlier reports for the Spanish case (Busom, 1993; Gum-
bau, 1997). Also as expected, the number of patents increases with the geographical
extent of the market. 
Concerning the variables regarding the ownership and management structure of
the firm, we have found same results in the different specifications of the model.
Mainly, ownership concentration presents a negative and significant effect, that is,
the greater the concentration of capital in one person or group, the lower the volume
of patents. Among other reasons, one may argue that closely-held firms could limit
the action of the managers in risky decisions, moving the firm away from the benefits
of specialisation. However, the effect of ownership concentration on patenting is not
independent of its foreign or public nature. This is shown by the significant parame-
ters of the multiplicative variables relating the concentration ownership and its status.
Closely-held firms with foreign capital have an even lower propensity to patent than
domestic firms. This could be explained by the fact that the patenting activity is gene-
rally taken by headquarters in the country of origin. On the contrary, state-owned
firms are more innovative than privately-owned firms. A possible explanation has to
do with the separation between the ownership and the management system, which
tends to be very high in public firms, with the managers being less reluctant to be in-
volved in innovation activities. Another possible explanation has to do with spin-offs
from universities and technological and scientific parks, which tend to be public in
Spain and of a high technological opportunity nature. 
The composition of the board of directors, measured by the percentage of owners
in management position tasks over the total of the number of employees in the firm,
seems to have a negative and significant parameter. As can be deduced from this re-
sult, the incorporation of owners in the firm decision-process might reduce the num-
ber of high-risk projects due to the lower specialisation of the owners in the patenting
system and in the technical tasks. 
242 Ortega-Argilés, R. and Moreno, R.
12 Ortega-Argiles  28/9/09  12:30  Página 242
The public company’s effect is ambiguous. However, the negative effect of ha-
ving foreign ownership could be explained by the fact that there is some evidence
that branch plants tend to have relatively little R&D activity, and that this is often as-
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12 The dependent variable is PAT, the number of patents and/or utility models awarded by the firm. In
brackets the standard deviation is present. Moreover, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% le-
vel and * 10% level. Estimations are made by maximum likelihood methods.
Table 3. Estimation Results. Baseline Model12
Variables
Poisson Negative Binomial 
I II III IV
RD
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
SHARE*FOR
SHARE*PUB
OWN
OWN*FOR
OWN*PUB
HIGH
MARKET
Intercept
α
0.032***
(0.005)
0.605***
(0.040)
–0.135***
(0.028)
–0.002***
(0.001)
–0.006***
(0.010)
0.010***
(0.003)
——
——
——
0.609***
(0.134)
0.535***
(0.057)
–3.153***
(0.020)
15.565***
(0.821)
0.031***
(0.005)
0.666***
(0.041)
–0.146***
(0.027)
——
——
——
–0.029***
(0.010)
–0.281**
(0.142)
–0.811*
(0.431)
0.500***
(0.133)
0.620***
(0.051)
–3.485***
(0.196)
14.811***
(1.061)
0.118***
(0.009)
0.225***
(0.040)
–0.040
(0.042)
–0.002**
(0.001)
–0.004***
(0.001)
–0.003
(0.003)
——
——
——
0.097
(0.093)
0.159
(0.127)
–3.532***
(0.185)
0.113***
(0.009)
0.119***
(0.038)
-0.029
(0.041)
——
——
——
-0.030**
(0.014)
-0.060
(0.166)
0.042
(0.243)
0.094
(0.091)
0.210*
(0.121)
-3.037***
(0.194)  
Wald test: 
Chi2(K-1)
N. Obs
N. Indivs
Log Likel: 
LR test ·=0;
chi2(1):
472.66***
8501
3417
–7018.18
25000***
561.23***
10114
3415
–8412.76
30000***
434.70***
8501
3417
–4315.71
311.75***
420.53***
10114
3415
–4913.32
543.57***
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sociated with the more routine development work rather than basic research (Howels,
1984). Indeed at the macro level the theories of “endogenous” growth have stressed
the importance of foreign direct investment as a vehicle for the import of superior
technologies, techniques and business methods (Romer, 1990). 
In the last columns of Table 3 the NegBin model estimations are shown; this mo-
del generalizes the Poisson by allowing for an additional source of variance above
that due to pure sampling error. Therefore, we have observed some differences in the
sign and significance of the variables explaining the outcome of the innovation pro-
cess on the type of model under estimation, either a Poisson or a NegBin. Econome-
trically, since our data show a clear overdispersion of zeros in the case of patents (the
coefficient of overdispersion of the NegBin model is statistically significant), the se-
cond estimation model is pointed out as the most accurate, and therefore their results
are the ones we prefer. The basic result of the NegBin models is that the patenting ac-
tivity is explained by the effect of the R&D effort and the size like other papers ex-
plained. But the most interesting fact is that there are some variables that remain sig-
nificant in the patentability activity of Spanish manufacturing firms. All in all, we
obtain that the knowledge accumulation through R&D investments is the most im-
portant effect for the patenting activity in Spanish manufactures (with a higher elasti-
city than in the Poisson model), as well as the size of the firms, since the bigger the
firm the more it patents. Additionally, once the overdispersion of the data is taken
into account, the firms’ ownership still matters with diffusely-held firms patenting
more than closely-held firms. This negative effect of ownership concentration is even
increased in the case of foreign owned firms, which patent even less. Concerning the
introduction of owners in the board of directors the same negative effect that the one
obtained with the Poisson estimation is obtained, although now this effect is indepen-
dent of the ownership structure.
Following the idea pointed by Yafeh and Yosha (2003) that the volatility of re-
sults in the papers that studied the relationship between corporate governance and in-
novative strategy may rely first on sectoral and technological differences among ot-
her aspects like the regional differences (Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Lee, 2005), we have
run the same regressions distinguishing between low-medium and high technological
opportunity sectors (Table 4). 
The main interesting finding in relation to corporate governance is that the varia-
bles proxying this issue are more significant in the high technological opportunity
sectors, with the signs maintained as for the whole sample. Concerning the owners-
hip variables, the concentration of the ownership and the inclusion of owners or rela-
tives in management decision tasks seem to have the same negative effect in all the
regressions. Only the composition of the board of directors seems not have the same
important effect in the non-high tech firms as in the firms that belong to high-tech
sectors, and the major cause is the lack of the knowledge in these types of activities
as far as the owners and relatives concerns. An additional interesting finding is the
contrary sign of the age variable in the two analysed sub-samples. This result under-
lines the existence of the necessity of a cumulative learning in the technological inno-
vative activities like the evolutionary economics pointed (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Dosi, 1988; among others). 
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4.1. The regional dimension
Finally, taking into account the importance of the environment where the firm is ope-
rating we have introduced the regional component in some specifications of the mo-
del (Table 5). 
The results show that firm’s location is important for explaining the patent acti-
vity of Spanish manufacturing firms. The effect of the spatial distribution of techno-
logical opportunities in Spain has been analysed by González and Jaumandreu (1998)
with similar conclusions being drawn. It seems that there is a positive effect on being
located in an environment with highly innovative activity (Table 5, column I, II and
III). In other words, the fact of being located where there is a high innovative activity
implies the existence of knowledge spillovers across individuals of different firms
which would result in a higher patenting activity as other authors found (Audretsch
and Feldman, 1999 and 2005; Greunz, 2004 and van der Panne, 2004). The results
show that the knowledge externalities arising from R&D activities feedback and loo-
ping relations among the individuals involved influence the regional innovation crea-
tion. On the other hand, the presence of agglomeration economies coming from a
dense labour market with a subsequent higher endowment of human capital (column
IV) would also imply higher levels of innovation outputs. Thus our results are consis-
tent with the literature that rely on knowledge-based theories of endogenous growth,
assuming that the density of economic activity facilitates face-to-face contacts and
thus knowledge and ideas flows either within (MAR externalities) or between (Ja-
cobs externalities) industries. After controlling for overdispersion, knowledge spillo-
vers and agglomeration economies seem to remain determinant in the patent activity
of Spanish manufacturing firms. On one hand, having a geographical extent of the
main market higher than the national one appears to favour accounting for patents.
On the other, being located in a region with a highly innovative environment seems
to encourage firm to patent. 
5. Conclusions
The separation of ownership and management is one of the main reasons that cause
agency problems in the investment decisions of the firm because of the informational
asymmetries between managers and owners. In this study we have analysed the effect
of some internal variables related with the firm ownership on its patenting activity.
On one hand, we have considered those based on the concentration of the ownership,
the inclusion of owners in the board of directors and the effect of the nature of the
ownership (foreign and public). Taking into account the high difference between the
sectoral aspects we have developed the analysis for two different groups of sectors
according to their technological opportunity. The findings fit with the theoretical ap-
proach that the control of the decision of the management team by means of concen-
tration of the ownership and introduction of owners in management positions tasks
reduced the amount of innovations pursued by the firm probably due to the reduction
of the specialization of the decision tasks and the adverse-risky innovative strategy. 
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The first ownership characteristics considered in the study is the effect of the con-
centration of capital in a small number of owners. This mechanism has a range of asso-
ciated disadvantages, related to the increased risk borne by the owners (due to the reduc-
tion in their number to obtain greater control levels), less liquidity in markets and fewer
opportunities for negotiation of the company’s values. As can be seen in our study, the
concentration of the ownership does not favour the amount of output in innovation. 
With regards to the composition of the board of directors, measured by the share
of owners in management and administration tasks with respect of the total amount
of employees, we observe that the effect is negative in the majority of the analyzed
regressions. The owners or relatives could move the company away from the benefits
of specialisation if the firm belongs to high-tech sectors because of the lack of exper-
tise. Specialisation is often necessary, in order to have directors with the ability to ad-
minister complex organisational structures, diversify risk among shareholders and
obtain large volumes of funds to acquire specific assets. Decreasing the divergences
of interests because of an increase in the number of owners in management positions
will make agency costs lower, but risky projects will not be adopted due to the failure
to take advantage of specialisation or because there is a high degree of concentration
of risk in the hands of a few owners. As shown in our results, an increase in the parti-
cipation of owners in management positions has a negative impact on the total
amount of patents and utility models awarded by the firm. 
Additionally, some other aspects regarding the environment where the firm is
operating are also significant for explaining the patent activity in Spanish manufactu-
ring firms. Operating in a global market has a positive influence, showing that the
greater the market area, the more intense the competition will be. The presence of ag-
glomeration economies as well as knowledge spillovers in the region where the firm
is located appear to be an engine for encourage firm to do patents. Spatial concentra-
tion of individuals, capacities, information and knowledge within a limited geograp-
hic area provides an environment in which ideas flow quickly from person to person.
Since dynamic externalities arise from communication between economic agents,
their effects should be more important and observable via patents within an environ-
ment where communications are focused, which eases face-to-face contacts and thus
the spillover of (tacit) knowledge and ideas. International competition or in a higher
innovative environment are more diverse and intense than competition in smaller or
lower innovative geographical areas, meaning that internal capabilities must be im-
proved by adopting riskier patents in order to obtain a safe market share. 
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